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Definitions and abbreviations  
UEFA = United European Football Association 
FFP = Financial Fair Play 
CB = Competitive balance 
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RPL = Rights pooling by the league model 
ICO = Individual club owner model 
SC = Salary cap 
CBA = Collective bargaining agreement 
HGP = Home-grown players 
GRS = Gate revenue sharing 
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Executive Summary 
Over the last two decades, European football has gone through massive structural 
changes. The end of foreign player quotas (Bosman ruling) and substantial increases in 
revenue have paved the way toward today’s two-speed Football hierarchy. Top teams’ 
revenues have increased exponentially while there has been little change in revenues 
for lower budget clubs. As a result, a trend of competitive imbalance has emerged. 
UEFA has tried to address these problems with Financial Fair Play (FFP), a regulation 
system which obliges teams to respect the principle of “break even”, meaning that clubs 
must not finance themselves with loans and “favors” from wealthy owners. While FFP 
has been successful in limiting clubs’ indebtedness and ensuring long term viability, it 
does not have the capacity to deal with competitive imbalance. As long as unequal 
distributions of revenue persist among teams and leagues, the issue of competitive 
imbalance will not be solved. 
This paper focuses on identifying recommendations that could lead to improved 
competitive balance in football. What would better competitive balance achieve for fans? 
With player talent more equally distributed, outcomes of matches and league 
competitions would be more difficult to predict and thus more enjoyable for spectators to 
follow. 
In arriving at the recommendations that are presented in this work, measures that have 
been successfully adopted in other professional sports are examined and tested. 
Firstly, the distribution of TV revenue in the UEFA Champions League is tackled. By 
emphasising the importance of one home TV market (market pool), UEFA does not treat 
all teams equally. Therefore, a system of distribution without market pooling has been 
developed and proposed. 
Secondly, the salary cap system was found to be a very effective tool in promoting 
increased financial equality among clubs and within leagues. 
Thirdly, the possibility of introducing a playoff system in football was addressed. Playoffs 
would increase the uncertainty of outcomes until post-season, however, implementation 
would be complex and would require changes in the number of teams per league.  
The results of this research reveal that tools to promote competitive balance do indeed 
exist, however, implementation barriers are quite high. Also, to avoid the threat of top 
teams deciding to break away and creating their own leagues if the regulating measures 
are too severe, compromises will be necessary in terms of the strictness of measures 
that will be adopted and applied. 
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1. Introduction  
Today, more so than at any other time in the history of European professional football, 
on-field success of a team is directly linked to its availability of abundant financial 
resources. Twenty years ago, “small-market” clubs such as Ajax Amsterdam and Red 
Star Belgrade were able to hoist the UEFA Champions League trophy. But today, what 
are the odds for similar teams possessing inferior financial clout (as a result of being 
based in either small-market and/or economically disadvantaged regions) to win the “cup 
with the big ears?” Since the unique exploit of Porto’s UEFA Champions League victory 
in 2004, no teams from outside England, Germany, Italy or Spain have managed to win 
championships. And this year, for example, and continuing a 5-year trend, two Spanish 
clubs were in the semi-final, confirming that there is a domination on European football 
by a handful of teams. The banning of quota restrictions for foreign players (following the 
Bosman ruling in 1995) and increasing financial polarization are at the source of the 
problem.  
What can the European football industry do to reverse this undesirable trend? What 
measures can possibly increase “competitive balance” in European football? Several 
solutions put forth which could improve competitive balance include (1) a more equal 
distribution of wealth among teams as well as (2) other important changes in governance 
such as salary caps and changes in the distribution of television revenue. 
The goal of this research paper is to identify and examine the best elements from these 
proposals in order to formulate recommendations which could lead to improved 
competitive balance in European football. In addition, we will study the possible impact 
that each of our recommendations may have on competitive balance as well any 
implementation barriers that may result from adoption of our proposed measures. 
1.1 Structure 
The initial approach in this paper will be to first determine and evaluate the driving factors 
in European football that cause changes in competitive balance. 
Secondly, UEFA “financial fair play” (FFP) and its consequences will be introduced. 
In the third section, measures that could increase competitive balance will be analysed 
and explored. Subsequently other solutions will be developed that may possibly go one 
step further than the financial fair play concept. Within this scope, the feasibility of 
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establishing a “salary cap system” based on the American sports model as applied in the 
English Premier League will be discussed. 
Finally, a review of all proposed measures will be presented with respect to their 
implementation barriers and effect on competitive balance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Football of yesterday  
 Football in the 90’s 
 The Bosman ruling 
 
 
Football of today  
 Football today 
 Competitive balance Change 
 UEFA regulations – Financial Fair Play 
 
 Football of tomorrow – What measures to increase competitive 
balance?  
 Distribution model for revenues in the UEFA Champions League 
 Salary cap, analysis of the American model and introduction of 
soft SC in the English Premier League 
 Gate revenue sharing 
 Obligation to field homegrown players 
 Playoff competition format in domestic league 
Recommendation 
 Comparison of all the proposals 
 Recommendation based on implementation barriers and effect 
on competitive balance for each measure 
 
 
Part 2 
Part 1 
Part 3 
Part 4 
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1.2 Literature review: 
The concept of competitive balance (CB) was first introduced in 1956 by S. Rottenberg, 
a forerunner in the study of economics of sport.  Introducing the theory of uncertainty of 
outcomes, Rottenberg posited that perfect competitive balance resulted in a 50%-50% 
chance of winning between two teams.1 Rottenberg also highlighted the importance of 
CB in order to maintain fan interest, an important element in ensuring healthy financial 
balance for clubs. 
Moreover, sports economics literature reveals the existence of three types of 
uncertainties which affect competitive balance:2 
1. Match uncertainty  
2. Seasonal uncertainty (intra-seasonal, mid-term) 
3. Championship uncertainty (over several seasons, long-term) 
In refining these factors, Késenne3 argues that studies about game uncertainty and 
seasonal uncertainty are not as relevant as championship uncertainty, where people 
dislike seeing the same teams winning championships repeatedly year after year.  
A more detailed review will be presented later in the competitive balance change chapter, 
including findings and metrics from the latest studies about CB in football today. 
Many theoretical studies exist concerning the effects that financial sharing measures 
have on CB. In examining secondary data from these studies, one is able to select what 
measures to test. This research paper will attempt to contribute to the existing body of 
knowledge of this concept by assessing the consequences of new financial or 
governance rules in European football. First, however, let’s compare and contrast among 
some of the important changes in European professional football of yesterday versus 
today. 
  
                                               
1 (Rottenberg, 1956), The Baseball Players’ Labor Market  Vol.64(3) 
2 (Goossens, 2006), Competitive balance in European football: comparison by adapting 
measures: National measures of Seasonal Imbalance and Top3 
3 (Késenne S. , 2007), The economic theory of professional team sports 
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2. Football in the early 90’s - Prior to Bosman Ruling 
The beginning of the 90’s marked a milestone in European football, with many factors 
having contributed to a liberalization of the game resulting in increasingly large inflows 
of revenue. Notable changes which have occurred at the end of 20th century can be 
categorized in three levels (local, national, International)4.  
On a regional basis, football used to be highly reliant on gate receipts and subsidies for 
the bulk of its revenues. In countries where subsidies were not allowed, private investors 
would compensate. Although sponsorships existed, these were typically local 
arrangements whereby clubs would associate with companies who were geographically 
located nearby to the clubs.  Examples are FIAT with Juventus in Turin, or Philipps with 
PSV, in Eindhoven.5 
The table below reflects changes in the revenue model of French clubs between 1970 
and 2000. Interesting to note is that it is only in the 90s that commercial revenue began 
to outweigh gate receipts.5 The revenue model was based on the so-called SSSL finance 
model where receipts materialized from spectators-subsidies-sponsors-local sources.5 
Figure 1 - The Evolving Structure of French Football Professional Clubs’ Finance 
- (ANDREFF, 2000) 
 
From a national perspective, changes occurred with the evolution in media. Traditionally, 
TV rights would be monopolized by public channels such as the ORTF in France or the 
BBC in England. Nevertheless, the arrival of cable TV and the creation of privately owned 
                                               
4 (Arne Niemann, Introduction: the transformation of European Football, 2011) 
5 (ANDREFF, 2000), The Evolving European Model of Professional Sports Finance 
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television companies such as Canal+ in France shook things up. Competition in the 
media industry brought significantly more money into football.  
In terms of international scope, it can be said that a “Europeanisation of football” came 
about beginning with the change of the Champions League format in 1992 from a knock-
out tournament to a tournament with group stages. As a result, the UEFA Champions 
League became more attractive, not only for fans, but also for sponsors and media 
broadcasters alike. This led to elevated championship prize money which allowed 
successful clubs the financial leverage to attract higher calibre player talent, thus 
consolidating their on-field dominance and becoming odds-on favorites to win league 
championships year after year. All of the above resulted in ever increasing fan interest, 
thus completing what could be referred to as a “power-cycle” business model for these 
fortunate clubs. 
Indisputably, however, the most significant change which began feeding into this “power-
cycle” business model occurred with the freedom of movement for European players.  
Indeed, before 1995, only three foreign players could be fielded by a team, due to 
restrictive quotas. As such, talent distribution was more homogeneous across Europe 
and teams could rely on nationally developed players to successfully compete. At the 
same time, with restrictive quotas in place, it was not possible for clubs, even with vast 
financial resources, to obtain an edge in terms of player talent. For example, teams such 
as Red Star Belgrade and Ajax Amsterdam, possessing excellent youth development 
and training programs, were able to win the Champions League, respectively in 1991 
and 1995. Everything changed, however, with the so-called Bosman ruling that will be 
discussed and developed in-depth in the next sub-section. 
2.1 The Bosman ruling 
Jean-Marc Bosman was a Belgium footballer, playing for the Royal club of Liège, which 
was, at the time, struggling to keep its place in the Belgium top league. In 1990, as his 
contract was about to expire, the R.F.C proposed a renewal, cutting his wage, however, 
from 120’000 Belgian francs to 30’000 Belgian francs.6  Bosman refused to accept this 
lower wage and desired, instead, to sign for a new club, USL Dunkerque, a second 
division French club. At that time, however, the rule in force was such that a player’s 
license was registered with the club he last played with and, unless the two clubs could 
reach mutual agreement on a transfer fee, Bosman would not be able to sign with 
                                               
6 (Schmidt, 2007), The effects of The Bosman-case on the professional football leagues with 
special regard to the top-five leagues 
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Dunkerque. Unfortunately, Dunkerque and Liège could not reach agreement on a 
transfer fee leaving Bosman with only two options: either accept a 75% wage cut or retire 
from football. With neither option acceptable, Bosman decided to pursue legal 
proceedings instead and his case was brought to court. The judgment was delivered by 
the European Court of Justice in 1995 resulted in the following outcomes: 
 « It became an illegal act to charge transfer fees for out-of-contract players who 
were moving to another club among the EU Nations.” 7 
 “The ‘Quota system’ which dealt with how many foreign players were eligible for 
clubs was completely changed, and clubs were now permitted to field as many 
foreign players from EU Nations as they wanted, with no restrictions.”8 
This arbitration reshaped European football. The result was the beginning of a “talent 
drain” towards high revenue leagues. In English leagues, for example, the concentration 
of foreign players increased from 20% in 1992 to 60% in 2007.9 Another example is the 
victory of the Italian club, Inter-Milan, in the 2009/10 UEFA Champions League, having 
no Italian players in the starting eleven. 
Moreover, the UEFA League ranking system completely reversed. The French 
championship La Ligue 1 descended from 2nd to 5th, whereas the English Premier League 
jumped from 7th to 3rd in 2001. Leagues with lower revenues such as La Ligue 1, 
Eredivisie and Portuguese Super-Liga were no longer financially able to retain player 
talent.  “This is a clear evidence of the distortion effects of “open” European football labor 
markets, and “closed” provincial football leagues.” 9 
  
                                               
7 (Alan, 2011),  
8 (Alan, 2011),  
9 (Vrooman, 2007), Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol, 54, No 3  
 
 
Increase competitive balance in European football, a strategic approach 
Emilien CRETTON 7 
 
3. Football today 
Today, football has become a substantial economic industry, accounting for 3.7% of 
Europe GDP and contributing to the employment of 15 million people in Europe.10 The 
combination of new, incoming investors and technological advances in media, have 
brought in huge inflows of money. This business model can be encapsulated in the so-
called “MC MMG” model, in which professional sports obtains revenue primarily from the 
Media-Corporations-Merchandising-Market as opposed to the “SSL” model (explained in 
football in 90’s), where gate receipts were formerly the main source of revenue for 
clubs.11 
As a result, top teams’ revenues have sky-rocketed over the past fifteen years, growing 
by a factor of six, as shown in the figure below. And, this trend is not likely to reverse. As 
of the 2013/2014 football season, the top twenty wealthiest clubs have recorded a growth 
of 800M Euro (+14%) from 1997/1998.12 
2013/2014 top 20 clubs revenues 6.2 Billion Euro 
1997/1998 top 20 clubs revenues 1.2 billion Euro i 
In the next sub-chapter, television broadcasting rights, new investors and new 
commercial strategies will be explored in more detail.  
3.1.1 TV broadcasting revenues 
A major part of revenue growth for European football can be explained by the increase 
in television broadcasting rights. Indeed, total broadcasting revenue for the big 513 has 
increased from €163 million in 1992 to over €3.5 billion in 2014 14.  
There are two types of revenue models for selling sports television rights, the ICO and 
the RPL models. In the individual club owner model (ICO), clubs negotiate directly with 
the media for selling TV rights of their own games.  
In the second model, the rights pooling by the league (RPL), the league negotiates the 
TV rights for all the games, and then redistributes the money to the clubs. 
                                               
10 (Arne Niemann, The transformation of European Football, 2011) 
11 (ANDREFF, 2000), The Evolving European Model of Professional Sports Finance  
12 (Deloitte football moneyleague, 2015) 
13 The big 5 correspond to the 5 biggest European football championships, English, Spanish, 
Italian, German, French 
14 (Statista, 2013) for 2013-2014 numbers,  (ANDREFF, 2000) for 91-92 
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The ICO model is highly criticized by the small clubs, because it often puts themselves 
in weak bargaining positions. Big teams have better players and attract many more fans 
around the world, affording them better bargaining power and thus, the means to win 
championship titles. In Spain, where the ICO model is used, the ratio between the club 
which earns the most and the club which earns the least is 10:1, against 5:1 in England 
where the RPL model is used. Smaller-market teams are trying to reverse this downward 
cycle by investing massively, hoping for successful sporting results and reasonable 
returns on investment, however, this is a high-risk strategy that does not always ends 
well. 
3.1.2 Rise in commercial revenues 
Football clubs have become global brands, thanks to global sales of TV broadcasting 
rights and the rise of internet. Many successful teams now have their own TV channels 
and, thanks to the rise of social media, they can now engage directly with their fans all 
over the world. Fans have access to exclusive content such as videos of trainings, 
interviews and/or game highlights and, of course, online stores. Real Madrid and 
Barcelona, for example, have more than 80 million followers on Facebook, the equivalent 
of almost two times Spain’s population. As a result, sponsors are increasingly eager to 
exploit clubs’ broadening public visibility and to associate their brands with football.  
Moreover, new sponsorship deals are reaching lofty peaks. As an example, Manchester 
United, the most valuable football entity in the world with a total share value of over £2.1 
billion, have recently signed a £750 million kit deal with Adidas.  
3.1.3 New investors 
The liberalization of the market and the change in clubs’ legal status has paved the way 
for an entrance of new investors in football. These investors can be split into two groups: 
(1) owners who have a long-term financial interest in acquiring and developing a club 
and (2) owners who are financially disinterested (i.e., owning a football club holds more 
personal and/or emotional interest for them rather than financial interest). 
Long-term oriented investors are interested in developing the club’s assets, thus 
increasing the market value of the club. There are many examples, especially in the 
English Premier League, where a few clubs are owned by American sports consortiums 
who are developing the infrastructure and merchandising.15  “A synergism can develop 
                                               
15 (MAINWARING, s.d.), http://online.wsj.com/ad/article/businessoffootball-owning.html  
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as a result of the interaction between sport and business. Merchandising, for example, 
has long been a practice of clubs. But they lacked the resources for full-scale marketing. 
Specialists are now doing a better job of promoting a larger variety of team merchandise 
to greater numbers of people across broader geographic areas.”16  
Viewing from different angles of the spectrum, football has become an investment vehicle 
as well for certain investors who are looking to promote their personal image or the image 
of their countries via the backing of multi-national investing consortiums.  Such is the 
case with the Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) club, which has been acquired by a Qatar 
investment group for the sole purpose of associating Qatar with major league football 
prior to the 2022 World Cup which will be hosted by Qatar. Other examples are individual 
investors who are contributing to the massive injection of money in Football. Probably 
the most famous of from this group of investors is Roman Abramovich, the Russian 
oligarch, who is said to have lavished £1 billion of his own fortune over ten years and 
which has brought Chelsea to the top of European football.17  
This inflow of money has certainly contributed to the inflation in both transfer fees and 
salaries of football players in recent years. 
  
                                               
16 (ANDREFF, 2000), The Evolving European Model of Professional Sports Finance 
17 (Austin, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/23064770  
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3.2 Competitive balance change in European football 
What is competitive balance? Why is important? How do we measure it? How is the 
competitive balance in European Football?  
“One of the key ingredients of the demand by fans for team sports is the excitement 
generated because of uncertainty of outcome of league games… In order to maintain 
fan interest, a sports league has to ensure that teams do not get too strong or too weak 
relative to one another so that uncertainty of outcome is preserved.”18 
“CB refers to balance between sporting capabilities. The more balanced the teams, the 
more uncertain the outcome of each match. A lack of CB will draw less spectators and 
media and reduce the total income for a league.”19   
So, it seems vital to maintain a certain threshold of competitive balance in order for a 
league to attract as many fans as possible. Also, in each of these definitions, the principle 
of uncertainty of outcomes is referred to. Perfect Competitive balance can therefore be 
explained as an equal probability of winning the game between two teams. Or, Perfect 
CB may be expressed as well as in terms that each participating team has equal odds 
of winning the championship. Competitive balance in European football, however, is not 
only about matches leading to championship trophies, it can also be applied with respect 
to promotion/relegation matches or for European qualification placement matches, for 
example. With respect to the methods of calculating competitive balance there are two 
approaches: 
 Static CB approach 
Where CB for each standing position in the league is measured. For example: 
comparing the number of percentage points of the top five teams to the total of 
points for the league (C5 index). Moreover, this method compares the uncertainty 
of outcomes when the league leader plays against the lower classified teams. 
Statistical tools such as the standard deviation or Gini index are often used with 
this model. The static measurement approach is highly statistical and is therefore 
used mainly by researchers and less so for the media and fans due to the difficulty 
in grasping this technique. 
 
 Dynamic CB approach 
                                               
18 (Quirk, 1992), Sport remains dominant driver of sponsorship 
19 (MICHIE, 2004), Competitive balance in football: trends and effects  
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Focuses on measuring how many times a team has won championships over a 
given period of time. In this model, the focus is on one or several teams and 
their results within the league, to determine if it is often the same ones who 
finish at the top or the bottom of the league. This method is easier for the public 
to understand, however, it does not produce academically rigorous results. 
 
Dynamic CB measurements in European leagues : 
 
 In the English Premier League, only five different teams have participated in the 
Champions League in the last ten years. 
 Spanish clubs Barcelona and Real Madrid have won nine of ten championships 
over the past ten years. Also, for the two periods, 1999-2004 and 2008-2013, 
the Spanish la Liga winner’s average points total rose from 75.8 to 96.4.20 
 Juventus has won four consecutive championships in the Italian Serie A League 
over the past four years. 
 In Germany, Bayern has been crowned champion for the third year in a row. 
 In the Swiss Super League, Basel has won seven out of the past ten 
championships, and Zurich won in each of the other three years. 
 Since the Bosman ruling (last 20 years), only one team which was not from one 
the top four most financially powerful leagues managed to win the UEFA 
Champions League. 
This is a non-exclusive list of Dynamic CB trends taken from several selected domestic 
leagues only. And, as stated above, although fans and the media typically rely on this 
data in evaluating competitive balance, results of dynamic CB measurements are not 
considered academically rigorous and, therefore, should be understood in this context. 
For a more complete and statistically accurate accounting, based on a larger set of 
league data, the static CB measurements method should be used. 
Static CB measurements in European leagues 
The latest findings from Static CB measurements in European football are dated from 
2013. In the study “How exciting are the major European football leagues”, professors 
Bloching and Pawlowski (a scholar in the UEFA Research Grant Program) compared 
CB in the five major European leagues from 1986 to 2011. 
 
                                               
20 (MARCOTTI, 2013), The Wall Street Journal, Champions League Gap Widens 
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The competitive balance21 ratio was used to assert long term CB in the five major 
leagues. CB measurements for each of these leagues decreased over the last ten 
years. The English and Spanish leagues trailed the French, German and Italian 
leagues in terms of uncertainty of outcomes. 22 
Figure 2 - CBR ratio for big 5 leagues over the last 20 years - (Bloching, 2013) 
 
With respect to short term CB, the authors compared betting odds between matches and 
no major differences over the years were found. Similar outcomes for middle term 
uncertainty were discovered which included as well competitive match results for 
European qualifying placements and promotion/relegation matches.  
 
                                               
21 COMPETITIVE BALANCE RATIO (CBR) = SDLP / SDTP 
SDLP is the standard deviation of the league points. Individual team points in a season / 
Average points in the league  
SDTP is the Standard deviation of a team points. Individual team points/ Average points of that 
team over several seasons 
22 (Bloching, 2013), How exciting are the major European football leagues  
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3.2.1 Wages vs. Sporting results relationship 
What are the relationships between teams’ robust financial resources and their Sporting 
results? Between 2009 and 2010, the difference in expenditures among Europe’s top ten 
wealthiest teams, and ten to twenty “less-wealthy” teams increased two-fold.23. 
And this is a figure that shows the difference among only the wealthiest teams. Does a 
financial gap, however, necessarily make for a difference in results? 
The following table represents the ranking in terms of points for the 2013/14 premier 
league. In addition, we have added the wage expenditures for each team. Manchester 
City, the team that spent the most on wages finished in first place. The team with the 
smallest wage expenditure, Crystal Palace, finished eleventh. And Everton, with a wage 
budget three times less, managed to rank ahead of Manchester United. These statistics 
show that Football is not only about money. Long-term managerial vision and a tight-knit 
group can still make a difference. 
Figure 3 - Premier league 2013/14 standings 
 
                                               
23 (UEFA, The European Club Footballing Landscape, Club Licensing, 2010) 
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However, even though the sporting results vs. wages relationship analysis is not perfect, 
a very strong linear correlation does exist as we can see on the graph below. And over 
the last ten years, only five different clubs have ranked in the top four places of the 
Premier league. 
 
3.2.2 CB consequences on attendance 
Attendance depends on many variables: 
 Sporting results 
 Ticket prices 
 Quality of facilities 
 Economic environment 
CB, however, is also one of the criteria as, according to Rottenberg, more CB attracts 
more fans.24 Since the decrease in CB over the last ten years, it might have been logical 
to expect a negative impact on the number of spectators visiting European stadiums 
every weekend. However, attendance for most European league matches actually 
increased, especially for Germany, England and France. This phenomena can be 
explained, on one hand, by recent investments in new facilities, which improved 
stadiums’ overall comfort and capacities. On the other hand, the increase of marketing 
expenditures as well as the internet has allowed clubs to improve interactive 
communications and attract more fans. 
                                               
24 (Rottenberg, 1956), The Baseball Players’ Labor Market  Vol.64(3) 
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In Spain and Italy, however, where there have been no major upgrades in stadium 
facilities over the past twenty years, results seem to suggest more correlation between 
CB and attendance. The figure below shows that over the last decade, Italian Serie A 
average attendance has decreased by 6’000 spectators per match. Concerning La Liga 
(Spanish league), attendance has remained somewhat stable. 
Figure 4 -Average total attendance for Spanish and Italian leagues25 
 
Taking a closer look at detailed numbers for the Spanish league, attendance records for 
both the 1999/00 and the 2013/14 seasons were compared.  The average attendance is 
the same.  The figures are distorted, however, by Real Madrid and Barcelona, the two 
clubs who have won nine of the past ten championship titles and who dominate la Liga.  
This analysis, then, confirms that the increase in spectators for those two powerhouse 
teams counterbalance a diminished average attendance for the other teams in the 
league.  
Figure 5- Average attendance for Real Madrid and Barcelona 
 
 
                                               
25 (Attendances Spanish league, 2015), http://www.european-football-
statistics.co.uk/attn.htm  
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Figure 6 - La Liga teams decrease in average attendance 
 
The decrease in attendance for some teams, therefore, cannot be explained by sporting 
results alone as teams with similar sporting results over the years have diminished in 
average attendance. The economic crisis in Spain and/or the increase in ticket prices 
may explain this difference. This leaves one option remaining, which is the change in 
competitive balance. 
3.2.3 Other CB change observations 
As explained in the previous sections (cf. football in the 90s and football today), there 
have been dramatic changes in the financing structures of clubs, as well as in the 
governance of football. But what are the consequences on CB? How has CB evolved in 
the last decade? 
Putting the focus on championship uncertainty in the five major European leagues, the 
diversity of teams that have been able to finish in the top three, at least one time over 
the past 40 years, were tracked. Finishing in the top three is especially important as it 
guarantees a qualification to the UEFA Champions League, which brings more revenue 
to teams.  
Even though a static measurement of CB, the following table shows what kind of teams 
were able to reach the top 3 in the last 4 decades. Are these teams still in the top 
positions today? Are they from a small or large market? (sizes of the cities and fan 
bases). 
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Figure 7 - Diversity in teams that have been able to reach the top 3 at least 1 time for the big 5 leagues 
The data was collected from the websites of the respective leagues. 
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The result is clear, never in the last 4 decades; there has been so little diversity in the 
number of teams able to finish in the top three as per today. The most obvious change 
happened in the English league, where in the years 1985-1995, 14 different teams 
reached the top 3 positions. On the contrary, in the last decade (2005-2014) only 5 
different teams reached the top 3 positions between. Even though it is more clear in 
England, this phenomenon happened in all the big 5 leagues, where many teams who 
formerly played major roles in their respective leagues prior to the Bosman ruling, 
disappeared from top positons, such as : 
 Fiorentina, Sampdoria, Parma 
 Leeds, Notthingam  Blackburn rovers 
 Lens, Metz, Nantes 
 Keiseslautern, Freiburger, Hertha Berlin 
Common attributes shared among a number of these clubs includes smaller market size 
(population base), and an overall smaller fan base than others.  The importance of pay 
per view TV and increased merchandising revenues for their competitor teams rendered 
these smaller-market clubs unable to compete sportively for the top positions. 
Some of these teams have been relegated to second division status (i.e., Nottingham, 
Blackburn Rovers, Auxerre, Lens, and Nantes).  Italian clubs Fiorentina and Parma have 
gone bankrupt trying to circumvent their competitive gaps by creating virtuous cycles.  
These strategies did not work and has resulted in bankruptcy for both teams.  A virtuous 
cycle is defined as the improvement of sporting results due to deployment of increased 
financial resources. 26 
  
                                               
26 (Baroncelli, 2006), Italian Football  
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Figure 8 - The virtuous cycle between sporting results and economic gain27 
 
3.2.4 Conclusion for competitive balance change 
Uncertainty of outcomes in European leagues has decreased and, as a consequence, 
results of matches are becoming easier to predict and football is less exciting for fans.  
Many well-known and respected teams having enjoyed hard-earned reputations as 
perennial contenders for league championships in a bygone era, have fallen by the 
wayside competitively. This is all due to the shift away from financial balance within 
leagues that has occurred since the Bosman ruling. Indeed, there is strong correlation 
between sporting results and the size of club payrolls and, without doubt, teams 
possessing robust financial clout have far better chances of winning than not. 
In addition, there is a link between competitive balance and attendance, as demonstrated 
in Spain and Italy. Where, except for the teams who compete every year for league titles, 
consolidated attendance for all teams combined has steadily decreased over the past 
fifteen years. 
3.3  UEFA regulations – Financial Fair Play  
The future of football is directly linked to the financial health of clubs and their ability to 
maintain a balance between their revenues and spending. In this scope, UEFA has 
introduced the Financial Fair Play, which is an extension of the actual licensing system 
for clubs participating in UEFA competitions. 
                                               
27 (Baroncelli, 2006), Italian Football  
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The first system of licensing was designed in 1999 following the Bosman ruling and its 
inflation effect and the scheme was obligatory only for clubs competing either in the 
Europa League or the Champions League.28 This new licensing system came into force 
for the 2004-2005 season and included various criteria with respect to infrastructure 
(safety standards for stadiums), staffing and financial requirements. Clubs were required 
to provide annual audited financial statements, proof that clubs had no overdue liabilities 
related to transfer activities as well as proof that clubs owed no debts to employees (i.e., 
past due wage payments, etc.). Despite the fact that clubs had to provide proof of 
solvency, this did not stop a number of clubs from becoming indebted in order to finance 
transfer fees or even pay salaries. 
 
Figure 9- Top division net losses FY 2006-2010 - Source29 
 
Although revenues increased for the period 2006 to 2010, rising costs out-paced revenue 
growth which created risk to the financial health of football.  This fact is borne out on the 
chart above which reveals that each year for this time period shows the net loss margin 
                                               
28 UEFA champion’s league and Europa league are the 2 championships for the European clubs. 
In order to qualify for it, clubs must reach a certain position in their respective national 
championships. 
29 (UEFA, The European Club Footballing Landscape, Club Licensing Benchmarking Report 
Financial, 2010) 
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increasing, meaning that teams from top divisions have lost significantly increasing 
amounts of money every year. 
In this context, UEFA decided to introduce new rules (Financial Fair Play) for the 
licensing of clubs, the main objectives are (UEFA)30 :  
• to introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances 
• to decrease pressure on salaries and transfer fees and limit inflationary 
effect 
• to encourage clubs to compete with(in) their revenues 
• to encourage long-term investments in the youth sector and infrastructure 
• to protect the long-term viability of European club football 
• to ensure clubs settle their liabilities on a timely basis 
To put it in a nutshell, UEFA’s FFP has two main aims: first, to protect the long term 
financial sustainability of European football; and secondly to restore competitive balance 
between clubs and leagues31.   
3.3.1 Application of the FFP 
So in practice what does FFP imply for clubs? Basically, clubs are not allowed to spend 
more money than they generate, respecting the principle of break even. However, it is 
interesting to note that UEFA does not include youth development, community 
development and cost of tangible assets as relevant expenses.32 Therefore, UEFA is 
encouraging teams to invest in infrastructure in order to develop middle to long-term 
incomes.  
Concerning the application of FFP, it is somewhat complex, as a progressive approach 
is used in the implementation of FFP. According to article 61, al 2 of the UEFA clubs 
licensing FFP regulation32 : 
The acceptable deviation is EUR 5 million. However it can exceed this level up to the 
following amounts only if such excess is entirely covered by contributions from equity 
participants and/or related parties:  
                                               
30 (UEFA, UEFA, The European Club Footballing Landscape, Club Licensing Benchmarking 
Report Financial Year 2012, 2012) 
31 (VÖPEL, 2011), Do We Really Need Financial Fair Play in European Club Football? An 
Economic Analysis 
32 (UEFA, UEFA clubs licensing financial fait play regulations, 2012) 
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a) EUR 45 million for the monitoring period assessed in the licence seasons 
2013/14 and 2014/15;  
b) EUR 30 million for the monitoring period assessed in the licence seasons 
2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18;  
c) a lower amount as decided in due course by the UEFA Executive Committee for 
the monitoring periods assessed in the following years. 
Therefore, if balanced out by shareholders, up to a certain threshold, losses are still 
considered acceptable. If the threshold is exceeded, a wide list of sanctions can be 
applied, by the UEFA Financial Control Body such as a fine, deduction of points or even 
the disqualification from UEFA competitions.33 
Actual sanctions were first applied in 2014 to nine clubs including Manchester City 
(England), Paris Saint-Germain (France), Galatasaray, Trabzonspor and Bursaspor from 
Turkey; Zenit, St Petersburg, Anzhi, Makhachkala and Rubin Kazan from Russia; as well 
as Levski Sofia from Bulgaria.34 
Both Manchester City and PSG have agreed to pay €60 million to reach settlements with 
UEFA. In addition, both clubs have agreed to wage “freezes” and limits to transfer 
spending over the next two seasons. If these requirements are met, both clubs will be 
eligible to recover €40 million back within two years. 
3.3.2 Critics of FFP 
As stated above, the main goal of FFP is to provide more equilibrium in clubs’ finances, 
as well as to promote competitive balance for the leagues.  Several published articles, 
however, have been openly critical with respect to the ability of FFP to restore 
competitive balance. 
One of the main criticisms regarding FFP is the fact that some clubs are allowed to incur 
financial losses, up to certain thresholds, under the condition that one or more 
stakeholder(s) are willing and able to guarantee the loss.  
This raises serious controversy in that it means that fortunate clubs bestowed with 
access to generous donors will cause less fortunate clubs who do not happen to have 
such good fortune to become disadvantaged. 
                                               
33 (UEFA, « Procedural rules governing the UEFA Club Financial Control Body », article 29 
Edition 2014, 2014) 
34 (ESPN, 2014) 
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Another issue concerns the self-perpetuating spiral of success. Success leads to higher 
revenues for clubs, which can then be invested in acquiring the best talent, coaches and 
managers, thereby creating a competitive advantage compared to other teams.  Break-
even requirements are going to prevent other clubs from catching up with top-tier teams.  
This sentiment was expressed by the president of PSG, Al Khelaifi, who said, “FFP 
protects the big clubs and obliges the smaller ones to remain small clubs.”35 The 
mechanism is simple, as was demonstrated in the competitive balance section, that there 
is a correlation between high revenues and good results in football. Therefore, as the 
financial gap between top teams and smaller teams is allowed to increase, it does not 
seem achievable for FFP to bring back competitive balance. 
In addition, as mentioned, UEFA does not consider investment in infrastructure as an 
“expense.” Yet, it is argued that investors are unlikely to invest in infrastructure if there 
is no possibility to improve the “competitive edge” of clubs. Assuming there is a positive 
correlation between sporting results and attendance, “if teams cannot improve by 
spending money on their on-field product then investment in infrastructure, most 
obviously stadium capacity, will not make a return in the long term”. 36 Hence, there are 
concerns that investment in infrastructure might only result in more indebtedness for 
small teams. 
Thus, with respect to Financial Fair Play, it has seemingly become more difficult for 
smaller clubs to “shorten the gap” with larger clubs. FFP creates financial conservatism 
in football as well as high risk of stagnation for smaller clubs, or clubs who play in smaller 
domestic markets where money retribution from media is quite modest. This outcome, 
undoubtedly, is the reason why none of the larger-market clubs were against the 
introduction of the Financial Fair Play. Viewed from this angle, FFP does not seem to be 
so “fair” at every level. Fairness is promoted in the sense that teams who do not 
overspend will not be disadvantaged in comparison to teams who finance themselves 
with loans. However, FFP does not promote a more equal distribution of wealth among 
clubs. Instead, it locks in a rigid hierarchy of teams in leagues and, therefore, does not 
resolve the competitive balance issue. 
  
                                               
35 (Touchot, 2014) 
36 (FLETCHER, 2010), The Fairness of UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules  
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4. Football of Tomorrow – What solutions for 
improving CB in European football 
As explained in the previous section, the set of measures taken by UEFA in implementing 
FFP does not have the capacity to counter the deterioration of competitive balance (CB). 
We are, in fact, witnessing the emergence of an elite group of clubs, resulting in lower 
interest for the sport and the fans.37 This is the reason why, in the second part of this 
paper, measures will be explored and tested, the adoption of which could lead to 
improved CB in European football. 
Before continuing, however, the complex issue of governance in European football must 
be addressed. Football is operated in a multi-organizational environment, where UEFA 
is an administrative and executive body for all of the member leagues that are spread 
multi-nationally across Europe. UEFA’s main role is to issue guidelines and promote the 
development of football as well as organizing European competitions. It has no mandate, 
however, with respect to the governance of national associations. UEFA requirements 
apply through its licensing system for clubs participating in the European competitions 
and any measures enforced by UEFA will benefit CB within European competitions only. 
For example, competitive balance in the Spanish league can only be regulated by the 
Spanish national football association, and the same applies for all other member national 
football associations within Europe. Therefore, in order to address the competitive 
balance issue in European football, measures have to be taken on two levels, national 
and international.  
This is a problem which does not exist in the North American sports model, where 
leagues are closed and league management is controlled by the voting rights of club 
owners. Furthermore, closed leagues require more regulation in order to promote CB38, 
this is why the American courts do not consider sports as an activity which has to be 
regulated by the traditional laws of competition. Therefore, most of the tools available to 
promote CB can be found in North American sports leagues’ models. As a result, North 
American sports leagues have trended towards “socialist” models, where gate revenues 
are shared, TV revenues are equally distributed and salaries are capped. For the fans, 
this results in a hyper competitive environment where “smaller-market” as well as “larger-
market” clubs can successfully co-exist and compete on more even terms.  
                                               
37 (Helde, 2014), A legal and economic analysis of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations’s 
effect on the competition in European football  
38 (ANDREFF, 2000), The Evolving European Model of Professional Sports Finance 
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In addition, in comparing American and European Sports governance, one can observe 
that in America, the management of professional sports and amateur sport is separated. 
In Europe, however, the same associations are responsible for regulating both amateur 
and professional sports alike, including football.39 
Figure 10 - Difference between European & American models of sport 
 
Model National league model in Europe North American 
League open  Closed 
Teams Win maximizer Profit maximizer 
Labor market Deregulated Very regulated (salary cap) 
TV revenues Pay per view & Performance Equally shared 
Team’s mobility Vertical (promotion & relegation) Horizontal 
Can change of city (franchise 
system) 
Competition 
format 
Championship Playoff 
Antitrust laws Subject to Antitrust laws  Exclusion from the antitrust laws 
Revenue sharing No revenue sharing Gate sharing 
Governance Umbrella system, UEFA->national 
leagues->teams 
League controlled by the teams 
 
Leagues in European sport are considered “open” because at the end of competitive 
seasons, teams ranking at the bottom positions can be relegated to inferior divisions or 
leagues and teams that finish at the top rankings in inferior divisions or leagues can be 
promoted to the next higher level division or league. This is in contrast with the American 
model, whereby the franchises (clubs) within a league remain in the same league year 
after year. Another difference is that American franchises can obtain approval (by a vote 
of all teams in their leagues) to move to another city if the market is more appealing 
financially (i.e., in terms of number of fans, etc.). This “horizontal mobility” of the 
American model does not exist in the European sports model. 
                                               
39 (UEFA, Vision Europe UEFA, 2005) 
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The objectives of team owners are also different in America than Europe. American club 
owners are typically successful businessmen who have built their careers and wealth by 
learning how to maximize revenue. Within that scope, all revenues are shared and 
salaries are capped, thereby leaving teams having to manage their operations with 
minimum margin between revenues and expenses. In European football, however, there 
is very little financial constraint imposed on clubs which creates “bidding wars” among 
clubs, all of whom want to sign the best players. With sporting results being the ultimate 
goal and often, “at any price”, as a result more and more clubs become indebted beyond 
their means or must rely on wealthy donors to survive. 
Regulations in the American sports model are designed to promote an equilibrium among 
teams and to maintain a minimum competitive balance. But can the American recipe 
work for European football?  
With respect to their consequences on competitive balance, the following 
recommendations are going to be tested in the following chapters: 
 Equal distribution of TV revenue from the UEFA Champions League  
 Implementation of a soft salary cap system in the English Premier League 
 Gate revenue sharing  
 Changing European leagues competition formats 
 Minimum of “home-grown” players on a team 
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5. Distribution of earnings from the Champions League  
In many domestic football leagues, the races for league titles are often sealed well in 
advance of the end of the season. Hence, most of the suspense lies in fierce battles for 
the Champions League (CL) qualifying placements. At stake is the prestige of playing 
against the elite of football, as well as the accompanying international exposure and, of 
course, the financial perks. In 2013/14, UEFA redistributed €904 million to the thirty two 
clubs which participated in the competition, amounting to an average of €28 million per 
team.40  Each team received a participation bonus of €8.6 million which represented 31% 
of the total amount. Another 24% was shared according to one’s performances, which 
are called performance bonuses. As an example, in the group stage, a win is worth €1 
million and a draw €500 thousand. Consequently, the prize money gradually increased 
with each stage of the competition. Of the remaining 45% or €409 million, this was 
distributed according to the TV market pool, and this is where controversy started. 
Figure 11 - Champions League revenue distribution 
 
The market pool is not distributed in accordance with sporting merits, but instead 
according to the proportional contribution of one’s national television market. Therefore, 
clubs from markets with large audiences receive more money than smaller-market clubs. 
As we can see on the graph below, 80% of the market pool goes to teams from the big 
five: France, Italy, England, Germany and Spain.  
 
                                               
40 (UEFA, UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League distribution to clubs, 2014) 
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Figure 12 - Market pool share by country – Source 41 
 
As an example, in 2013/14, both Juventus (Italy) and Basel (Switzerland) were not able 
to advance past the group stage, however, Basel managed to acquire more points than 
Juventus. Yet, in the end, Juventus accumulated €43 million of revenue from the CL and 
Basel only €13 million, almost three times less. This is a direct result of the market pool, 
which grants more revenues to teams from the big five.  
Figure 13- 2013/14 revenue distribution Italian teams vs Basel 
 
                                               
41 (Helde, 2014), A legal and economic analysis of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations’s 
effect on the competition in European football, page 87 
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On the same chart, one can also observe that Juventus received more money than Milan, 
despite the fact that Milan qualified for the round of 16 and Juventus did not. This 
difference can also be explained by the fact that Juventus was the Italian champion that 
year. In addition, the title holder receives a larger share than other teams from the same 
country.  
Therefore, in order to receive maximum revenue, a club needs to be a member of one 
of the big five countries, advance as far as possible in the tournament and hope for early 
elimination of its domestic rivals. Also, this revenue model emphasizes the virtuous cycle 
theory, whereby a team who wins receives more financial support and thus has more 
money to recruit the best talent for the future. In summary, after all is said and done, this 
team is more likely to continue winning than the other less fortunate clubs.  
Clubs from the big five already have the advantage of receiving more money from their 
home markets, so why should they also benefit from larger revenues for equal sporting 
merits on a European scale? This practice, of course, emphasizes financial polarization 
among the other European leagues and has a negative impact as well on CB. However, 
what would be the consequences of revenue distribution without the market pool for the 
CL?  
5.1 Possible scenarios 
The first concern would be to evaluate how to share the €409 million from the market 
pool. There are three possible options. In the both of the first two options, the money 
from the market pool is either included in the participation bonus or the performance 
result. In the third option, the money is proportionally distributed between the 
participation bonus and the performance bonus. What would be the consequences of 
each option? Which one would be the most appropriate? 
 Participation 
bonus 
Performance 
result 
Market Pool Total 
Current model 275.2 M (30%) 224.8 M (25%) 409.6 M (45%) 904.6 M 
Option 1 684.8 M (75%) 224.8 M (25%) - 904.6 M 
Option 2 275.2 M (30 %) 629.4 M (70%) - 904.6 M 
Option 3 520.9 M (57.5%) 383.6 M (42.5%) - 904.6 M 
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In order to compare each option, a new revenue distribution model hypothesis is run and 
is based on the revenue for each team in the CL 2013/14.  
5.1.1.1 Tools for data analyzing 
To analyze the data results, statistical tools such as the GINI index and the Lorenz curve 
are used. The Gini index is one of the most ubiquitous tools to calculate inequalities of 
revenue in sample populations. The closest to 0 the value of the Gini index is, the fairer 
is the revenue distribution.  
With respect to the Lorenz curve, it shows the cumulative wealth for each group under 
the equality line that represent a perfectly even revenue distribution among the 
population. The bigger the area under the Equality line, the more unfair is the distribution. 
The Lorenz curve will also allow for comparisons of the changes in distribution for the 
richest and the poorest, from one model to the other. Refer to the appendix for complete 
calculations and figures for all clubs and their revenues. 
5.2 Which option? 
Figure 14 - Lorenz curve for the 3 options 
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Option 1 : Participation bonus 70% - Performances bonus 25% (of revenue) 
 Gini index : 0.12 smallest one->most balanced distribution 
 Lorenz curve : 0.06 smallest area 
 Minimum amount per team : € 21.4 million 
In this option, the money from the market pool would be used for the participation bonus42 
and each club would receive, at least, €21.4 million. In addition, the orange Lorenz curve 
which represents this option, is the closest to the equality line which means that it is the 
most fair in terms of revenue distribution. 
This system, however, could have disrupting effects on domestic league CB because 
the extra revenues could widen the financial gap in smaller domestic leagues. In other 
words, by narrowing the financial gap on a European basis, UEFA would create more 
inequalities in other leagues. For example, in Switzerland, where the total revenue from 
TV broadcasting amounts to €23 million,43 the team winning the championship and 
participating in the CL, would develop a particularly strong competitive edge compared 
to the other teams of the Swiss championships. So, the Swiss team participating in the 
Champion’s League would receive €21 million, more than all the other Swiss teams 
combined. And, the only way for smaller teams to catch up would be to try to create a 
virtuous cycle (i.e., investing and hoping for successful sporting results). Therefore, by 
improving the CB in its competition, UEFA would worsen CB in the national 
championships. 
Also, this option would be highly unfavorable for teams from the big five. The risk would 
be that these teams may decide to break away from the UEFA system and create their 
own competition and this is a scenario that UEFA wants to avoid at all cost. 
Option 2 : Participation bonus 30% - Performances bonus 70% (of revenue) 
 Gini index : 0.35 biggest ratio ->least equal 
 Lorenz curve : 0.17 biggest area ->least equal 
 Minimum amount per team : € 8.6 million 
                                               
42 The minimum amount that every team which qualify for the champions group stage get 
43 (Alyce, 2014), http://www.ecofoot.fr/finances-super-league-suisse/  
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This second option would emphasize sporting merits, since all money from the market 
pool would be included in the performance bonus. The minimum amount distributed per 
club amounts to €8.6 million, the lowest of the three options. Thus, this is the model that 
would create the most inequalities, the highest Gini index, and the Lorenz curve with the 
largest area.  
On the other end of the spectrum, there are some teams which would benefit from this 
system, such as the winner of the 2013/2014 CL edition, who would earn €90 million 
instead of €50 million. Also, teams from smaller TV markets who usually perform well, 
such as Portuguese teams or the Ukrainian side of Shaktar Donetsk, would benefit from 
this option. Indeed, these teams often pass the group stage of the UEFA Champion’s 
League and are able to compete with other teams from the big five. By allocating to them 
the same money as other teams from larger markets, these teams would be able to retain 
their talent and develop and become even more competitive in future years.  
Clubs from the big five with poor performances would be the losers. In the example of 
Olympique de Marseille, which did not score any points in the group phase would earn 
€8.6 million instead of €32 million. (See the appendix for all the financial consequences 
of each option for every team). 
Option 3 : Participation bonus 57.5% - Performances bonus 42.5% (of revenue) 
 Gini index : 0.21  
 Lorenz curve : 0.10  
 Minimum amount per team : € 16 million 
The money from the market pool would be shared between participation bonus and 
performances bonus. The Gini index of 0.21 (compared to 0.27 for the current model), 
the gap between the poorest and the richest would narrow. Also, as can be observed on 
the Lorenz curve, there is a point at which the blue line crosses the grey line. This means 
that 20% of teams with the best results would receive even more money under this 
option. An example here is Real Madrid, the winner of the 2013/14 edition who would 
have earned €65 million instead of €57 million. 
As in the second option, the clubs who would lose the most would be those from the big 
five who did not perform well. Conversely, teams from smaller markets with good 
performances would be benefit from this option. 
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5.2.1 Data analysis 
Since there is a positive relationship between financial means and sporting results. A 
distribution model that narrow the financial gap between teams would benefit CB. Thus 
by dropping the market pool, UEFA could develop better CB in its competition. 
The model recommended is the 3rd option, as the 1st option would go against the 
interest of too many powerful stakeholders, mainly the biggest Europeans teams. Top 
teams might not be willing to participate in the Champions League anymore, and break-
away, creating their own European competition 
Option 2 which recompense only performances is not recommended. The Champions 
League is partly a knock out competition, and a defeat at some stage of the competition 
could have dramatic consequences for the finance of some teams. Moreover, the fact 
that so much money is at stake during a game would encourage some teams to play for 
defensively to protect a result. Which could hurt the show for the fan. 
Therefore a model where the money from market pool is both used in the participating 
bonus and performance bonus is the most recommended. Teams which access to the 
quarter final would still earn as much money as before, therefore top teams would not be 
against the measure. In addition, the distribution of wealth would be much more even, 
and sporting result would have more impact on team’s revenues. 
The figure below shows how the revenue distribution in the Champions League would 
look like with the option 3, without market pool. 
Figure 15 - CL revenue distribution without market pool 
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The following represent the old model, with market pool where the money was mainly 
distributed depending on one’s country TV market importance 
Figure 16 - CL revenue distribution with market pool 
 
In a model without market pool, the minimum earnings goes from €11 million to €16 
million. Teams from the big5 with poor European performances like Juventus and 
Marseille would be the biggest losers. 
A model without market pool would improve the general wealth of teams from smaller 
market. Thus reducing the financial power gap and improving competitive balance. 
Performances would be emphasised and competitive balance improved. However, as 
the teams with best performances would earn just as much before. The introduction of 
the measures could be possible since most stakeholders would benefit from the system. 
Consequently, a new distribution model would make some teams more dominant in their 
home markets, such as Basel in Switzerland, which, thanks to the revenue of the 
Champions League, can easily stay at the top of the league every year. In order to 
counter this phenomenon, another financial restriction such as a salary cap would have 
to be enforced in order to safeguard domestic competitive balance. 
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6. Salary Cap 
A salary cap is a financial instrument that limits clubs payroll. By creating economic 
constraints on teams, a salary cap model promotes competitive balance within a 
league.44  
There are 2 main types of salary cap (SC), the soft salary cap, where the cap can be 
exceeded by paying a luxury tax. And the hard cap which cannot be exceeded. 
There are also other variables that can be changed, such as whether the salary cap (SC) 
is a fixed amount for every team (absolute cap), or the SC is % of the total revenue 
(relative SC) 37. In addition, there can be a salary cap on the entire team salary (team 
SC) or on the salary of one single athlete (individual SC). 
Therefore, every sport has its own tailor made SC, depending on the needs for 
regulation. For the American sports league, here is a quick summary of the kind of SC 
introduced for each sports. 
 
We can see that Basketball and Baseball are the only leagues without a hard SC. 
Baseball’s competitive tax is not called a SC but it technically is actually, since it sets a 
threshold of maximum payroll that teams can exceed by paying a tax.  
6.1 What SC model for a European football league? 
European football is a very fragmented market and the actual revenue variation between 
teams is such that the introduction of a hard salary cap does not seem an appropriate 
tool. Indeed, if a salary cap system was to be applied, top teams would have to share up 
to 2/3 of their revenues. The introduction of a hard salary cap would prevent these teams 
from respecting their contractual commitments towards players and sponsors. Therefore, 
we will focus on a soft SC system. 
Concerning Individual SC, I would like to mention the research of Stefan Késenne, an 
eminent professor in economics of sport who has proven with empirical data, the positive 
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correlation between SC and CB.44 However, his research also underlines the negative 
effect of an individual salary cap on CB, indeed if a top player’s salary is set under market 
equilibrium, it will create “excess demand on the player labor market”. In this situation, 
top players will prefer playing for “richest teams, as they can provide more fringe benefits 
and greater exposure”. Thus, individual SC would create more competitive imbalance 
within a league. For this reason, we will not consider an individual SC 
A soft SC or competitive balance tax on the overall payroll is actually quite similar to the 
UEFA FFP. However, UEFA FFP’s threshold is not set by a fixed amount, but rather 
adapts to the financial characteristics of each teams. Whereas in North American sports 
league, SC is always an absolute amount.  
First of all, we will be looking at the payroll rules in NBA, which uses the luxury tax model. 
Consequently, we will discuss the possibility of implementing a soft SC system in 
European football inspired on the NBA model, and what the consequences would be if 
implemented. 
6.2 Salary cap in NBA – case study 
The national basketball association (NBA) is regulated under a collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA). The CBA is a contract between the 30 NBA franchises and the 
association of players. It includes a salary cap as well as a salary floor, the rules for 
trades, the procedures for the NBA drafts and all other details necessary for an NBA 
game to take place. 45  
The salary cap in the NBA is considered as soft cap, because teams are allowed to 
outspend under the condition that a “luxury tax” must be paid. It is the re-negotiation of 
the CBA, during the season 2010-2011, which lead to the lockout, when players refused 
to play. The issue was that franchise owners wanted to introduce a hard salary cap 
instead of a soft salary cap. The association of players was against this measure and 
started a strike, because it would have had a downward effect on their salary. On the 
contrary it would have had a positive effect on clubs owners’ revenues.37 As a 
compromise, both parties agreed on the introduction of a luxury tax.  
The implementation was gradual, the first year for each dollar overspent, one dollar in 
tax had to be paid. But today the tax penalty is much higher and depends on the amount 
                                               
44 (Késenne S. , 2003) 
45 (Coon, 2015) 
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overspent and whether or not a team is a “repeat offender”.45 Basically, the luxury tax 
does not forbid teams to overspend, but the cost of overspending becomes very high. 
As the tax rate increase exponentially, teams willing to overspend have to pay huge 
amount for the luxury tax. And the more tax is paid, the more money other teams receive, 
contributing to the general financial equilibrium of the league. The table below shows the 
different tax rates applied in function of the amount overspend above the salary cap 
which is $63 million for the season 2014/15. 
Figure 17- Luxury tax rates in NBA- Source45 
 
In 2013-2014, the total of financial penalties amounted 71 million, the Lakers, the Heat, 
and the Knicks and the Nets being the team who contributed the most to the luxury tax. 
50% of the money from the luxury tax goes to teams which don’t pay taxes, the other 
50% mainly goes to the revenue sharing program of the league.45 
As revenue increases gradually, the SC in NBA also rise over the years, in the last 10 
years the tax was raised by almost $20 million, reaching $63 million for the season 
2014/1546. Because the revenues of teams from bigger cities raise more rapidly than 
teams from smaller markets, the salary floor put smaller teams in an unsustainable 
situation. A parallel can be made here with European football, where even though there 
is no salary floor, smaller teams have been put at disadvantage because of the fast rise 
in salaries, leading to unequal distribution of talents amongst European leagues. 
Nevertheless, in order to counter this effect, the NBA has introduced a revenue sharing 
program which works as follow: 
1. All teams are required to contribute 55.8% of their revenues to a common pool. 
2. 50% of this pool is equally distributed amongst all teams 
3. The remaining 50% is only distributed amongst team who did not infringe the 
SC rules. 
                                               
46 (realgm, s.d.) 
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It is quite a paradox to see that in the United States, one of the most liberal country in 
the world, sports is run in a socialist manner. But thanks to these measures, 2/3 of the 
NBA franchises were profitable in 2013/2014. And in terms of CB, alike all American 
sports leagues, NBA seems to provide a better CB than European football.47  
Several aspects of the NBA SC could be introduced in Europe, including the luxury tax, 
which would allow team to overspend by paying a penalty. The equal distribution of the 
money from penalties would also make sense in Europe, as it would narrow the financial 
gap between small and big teams. The gradual implementation is essential in order to 
successfully implement a new rule.  
However, different rate depending on the amount and whether or not the team is a repeat 
offender, might be impossible to apply in Europe. The distribution of revenues is very 
unequal, therefore some teams would have to pay too much and would have incentives 
to quit the league. 
6.3 Implementing a soft salary cap in the English Premier 
League 
As mentioned in the “competitive balance change” part, there is a clear correlation 
between points and sporting results in the Premier league, as in all others leagues. 
Therefore what would be the consequences of a SC on competitive balance? In order to 
answer the question, we are going to test a model of salary cap in the Premier league. 
But first, the constraints of implementing a SC must be addressed. What kind of 
threshold? Would a relative SC (% of spending according to revenue) or absolute (fixed 
amount) SC be better? 
A relative percentage of total revenue  
Example, the payroll must not exceed 70% of total revenue. 
 Pros : This cap adapts to each teams capabilities. Easy to implement in a league 
with unequal distribution of wealth 
 Cons : This measure is actually similar to the FFP. The effects on CB are very 
limited 
Absolute amount based on average payroll with luxury tax 
                                               
47 (82games.com, s.d.) 
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 Pros : This measure definitely has a positive impact on CB, as we have seen in 
the NBA case study. If the money from the luxury tax is redistributed, it narrows 
the financial gap. 
 Cons : If only one league introduce this system, teams from other leagues would 
have a competitive disadvantage in European cups such as the Champions 
League. Also, national football associations have an interest in their teams to 
perform well in European competitions. Indeed, the number of European 
qualification places for each country is set by the UEFA coefficient system, which 
is an index reflecting the performance of the club who participated in European 
competitions in the last 5 years. The better teams from a country perform, the 
more European cup qualifications places a league will have. Therefore an 
asymmetric introduction of an absolute SC in the different European domestic 
league would create unfairness between the different leagues. 
Relative amount based on a ratio between the lowest payroll and highest payroll 
Example, a ratio of 3:1 between the team with the highest payroll and lowest payroll has 
to be respected. It the threshold is exceeded, a luxury tax has to be paid 
 Pros : Allow the league to keep financial disparities within a certain limit 
 Cons : The SC would depend on the team with the lowest payroll, in open league 
with promotion and relegation, the budget of the poorest team can vary. Thus it 
is an unstable system. 
6.3.1 Relative or absolute salary cap for the English Premier League? 
A SC based on a relative % of revenue unfortunately have too little impact on CB, 
therefore we will not consider it. The payroll ratio is excellent for CB but the stability is 
poor due to the promotion and relegation system. The SC based on the average payroll 
of the league seems the most adapted, it has a positive effect on CB and offers more 
stability than the payroll ratio.  
Model Effect on CB Implementation difficulty Stability 
Percentage of revenues low easy high 
Average payroll of the league high moderate high 
Payroll ratio high moderate low 
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Key success factors for implementing a SC in English Premier League? 
 Teams shall not pay more luxury tax than the money they receive from the 
league, otherwise they might have an incentive to quit the league 
 To have a positive impact on CB, money from luxury taxes fines shall be 
distributed evenly amongst all teams 
 Implementation has to be gradual. A period of adaptation has to be given to 
teams. 
 
 Keep the FFP rules, to counter indebtedness risk. 
6.3.2 Information and rules for the salary cap model tested in the 
English Premier League 
 Teams who participate in the Premier league 2013/14 
 The SC threshold is set by doing the mean of all team’s wages participating in 
the Champions League. Salary cap = £83 million  
 Source for wages : http://www.financialfairplay.co.uk/latest-news/wage-spend-
versus-points-achieved  
 The implementation of the SC is gradual. 3 years before the SC is put in place. 
The tax represents 40% of total overspent for the first years. The percentage 
could change for the following years depending on the results 
 Equal redistribution amongst team 
 We assume that teams are win maximizers and that they would spend all the 
money collected from the luxury tax new/better players, thus increasing their 
wages 
 No individual salary cap 
 The total payroll must not exceed 80% of the total revenue. Sanctions as per the 
FFP (financial penalty or sports sanctions) 
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6.3.3 Results 
The following table shows the result of a soft SC for the season 2013/14, based on the 
average payroll, with luxury tax and equal redistribution of the money from the penalties.  
 
Only 6 teams out of 20 would pay a luxury tax, they would clearly be the losers, if a SC 
was to be introduced. 
If we assume that all teams are win maximizers, the CB would be improved, since they 
would reinvest the money from the luxury tax in acquiring new talents. 
Even though the gap is still enormous between the team which spends the most and the 
one which spends the less, the ratio went from 5:1 to 3:1. Also, the Gini index indicates 
that there is of course a better distribution of wealth thanks to the SC. 
Concerning the tax rate, it has been set at 40%, assuming that this is the first year. It 
would be increased in the following year. But, the rate does not have to be set too high, 
so that the richest teams don’t break away from the league and create a parallel one.  
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But is it really in the advantage of the league to apply a SC rule? The best teams 
participate in the Champions League and represent the interest of England in Europe. 
Thus, the league might have an incentive to favour them. We can see that in 2014/15, 
English teams underperformed compared to other leagues. And if the trend would 
continue in the next years, they would lose a European qualifying seat, in favour of Italy. 
Therefore there is a real danger. 
 
In addition, depending on the league format (open or closed), a salary cap can have 
different effects. In an open league, the introduction of a salary cap will have an impact 
on the overall performances of teams which play each other in European competitions. 
Therefore, an asymmetric introduction of a salary cap in the different European leagues 
would contribute to competitive imbalance.  
In the case of a closed league, teams do not compete with other teams from other 
championships; therefore the international competitive factor does not have to be taken 
into account.  
As the economic situation differs from one league to another, the introduction of a 
common European salary cap is not possible. Therefore, the easiest way to implement 
a salary cap in European football would be in the case of a reunited league (breakaway 
league). 
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6.4 Gate revenue sharing  
In North American leagues, gate revenue sharing (GRS) is a common practice. “In 
American Football (NFL), 40% of gate revenues go to the away team. In major Baseball 
league, the league collects a fixed share of net local revenues and redistribute these 
revenues in a progressive manner such that team with lower revenues receive a greater 
part of the pool which is redistributed”48 As franchises from bigger cities get more 
revenues, GRS has become necessary to even the financial means of every teams. 
In European football, gate revenue sharing used to be practiced until 1983, when it was 
abandoned48. But what would be the consequences of a GRS system in a European 
football league? 
There has been numerous empirical research about GRS. And most of them contradict 
one another, based on 2 variables. Are team owner profit or win maximizers. And do the 
dominant teams come from a large or small market? In addition, these research do not 
take into account many other variables such as the difference in long term asset and 
liability. Sports economic models referred to in other chapters will therefore not be taken 
into account here 
One of the main challenges in implementing this rule in a European league is directly 
linked with the legal constraint. In a legal system where sports is considered as a regular 
economic activity, revenue sharing could be considered as a breach of economic 
freedom.49 American sports do not have to deal with this problem, as the American legal 
system has set provisions, ruling that sports is not a common economic activity, and that 
it should not be subject to the anti-trust laws. 
In addition, most of American franchises regularly update their stadiums, which they are 
owner of. On the contrary, in Europe there are still many stadiums which are owned by 
cities, and the team pay a rent to the city. But some teams, recently invested a lot of 
money in stadium facilities, which are long term tangible assets that offer a stable return 
on investment over the years thanks to gate revenues and merchandising.  
On the other hand, some teams prefer to invest in acquiring players. But player’s value 
can change very quickly, depending on their age, injuries and performances. This is why 
players are considered as middle term intangible asset which are more risky due to their 
                                               
48 (Sergiy Butenko, 2010), Optimal Strategies in Sports Economics and Management 
49 (Helmut Dietl, 2010), Competitive balance and Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues with Utility-
Maximizing Teams 
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volatile value. It would be unfair for the teams which have invested and indebted 
themselves for improving facilities, to give up the revenues of their investment in favour 
of teams with a short term vision. 
Therefore, if gate revenue sharing was applied, in the future it could refrain investment 
in long term asset, as teams shall have to share revenues from these investments.50 
GRS is a valuable tool, which make sense in a closed league, where all teams are owner 
of their stadiums. But it seems difficult to apply such regulation in a league where there 
is still so much difference in long term asset investments. 
6.5 Minimum of home grown-players in a team 
In what has become a globalized European football labor market, one the main objective 
of UEFA is to foster youth training within clubs. The goal is to protect the interest of young 
players, give them a chance to play and develop all their potential. In this scope, they 
have introduced a quota of minimum home-grown players (HGP), to be named in the 
squad participating in the Champions League and Europa League. Starting from the 
season 2008/09, a minimum of 8 home-grown players must be integrated in a 25 man 
squad51, so that teams have an incentive to foster young players. 
But what is a home grown players for the UEFA? 
 “UEFA defines locally-trained or 'home-grown' players as those who, regardless of their 
nationality, have been trained by their club or by another club in the same national 
association for at least three years between the age of 15 and 21. Up to half of the locally-
trained players must be from the club itself, with the others being either from the club 
itself or from other clubs in the same association.”51 
According to the UEFA, there are no constraints about the nationality of the players, 
because it would be considered as illegal under EU freedom of movement’s laws 
(following the Bosman ruling). It means that teams can buy young foreign players, loan 
them to another club until they reach good level and transfer them back from the loans.  
Concerning the legality of the rule, the EU has commissioned a pool of researchers to 
examine this quota rule. The research concludes: 
                                               
50 (Philips, 2008), Should european football adopt a revenue sharing scheme 
51 (UEFA, Protection of young players, 2014), http://www.uefa.com/news/newsid=943393.html  
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“The home grown player rule amounts to an indirectly discriminatory rule because even 
though the Rule is neutral in terms of nationality, national workers are placed at an 
advantage over migrant workers.” 52 
But, “An indirectly discriminatory measure that restricts a worker’s free movement can 
be accepted in law only if it pursues a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and is 
justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. The justifications presented by UEFA 
in support of the rule, namely that it promotes competitive balance and encourages the 
training and development of young players, must be accepted as legitimate.” 
Therefore, because it is not a directly discriminatory measure, and for the sake of 
competitive balance (CB), the home-grown players rule is not in breach of the EU 
freedom of movement. However, the same commission qualified the effect of the rule on 
CB as “very modest”. In addition, the commission advances that there is little evidence 
of an improvement in youth development since the introduction of the rule. 
Indeed, even though the number of home-grown players (HGP) has increased over the 
last years as per the (first chart), the size of the team named for the competition has also 
increased (second chart). 
Figure 18- Proportion of home-grown players in squad list for UEFA competitions 
– Source 53 
 
  
                                               
52 (Murray Dalziel, 2013), Study on the Assessment of UEFA’s ‘Home Grown Player Rule’ 
53 (Murray Dalziel, 2013), Study on the Assessment of UEFA’s ‘Home Grown Player Rule’ 
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Figure 19 - Average team size for teams in UEFA competitions - Source54 
 
The third figures shows the average minutes played in UEFA competitions, and confirms 
the assumption that even though young players are called more often in the first team, 
they do not play more. As in fact, the average number of minutes for HGP is still the 
same since the introduction of the rule. So HGP, would actually just be integrated in the 
team in order to respect the rule.  
Figure 20 - Proportion of minute played for HGP in UEFA group stage competitions 
- Source54 
 
 
Therefore, should UEFA go further in regulating and oblige teams to field a minimum of 
home-grown talents?  
                                               
54 (Murray Dalziel, 2013), Study on the Assessment of UEFA’s ‘Homegrown Player Rule’  
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6.5.1 Obligation to field at least 3 home-grown players 
Would obligating teams to field home-grown players (HGP) help to increase CB? What 
can we learn from countries with such regulations? 
Only 3 countries from the EU have introduced rules that oblige teams to field a minimum 
of HGP on the score sheet.  
 Belgium 
At least 8 HGP in the squad list 
At least 6 HGP on the score sheet 
 Finland 
Half of the players from the squad list have to be HGP 
At least 4 HGP have to play in the match 
 Latvia 
Only 5 non HGP can be on the field 
 Yugoslavia 
At leas 3 HGP have to be field 
The countries mentioned above are considered as small markets. In fact none of the big 
leagues have adopted a rule that would oblige teams to field home-grown players. 
The example of Sweden is also interesting, as it is the country with the strictest rules, 
half of team has to be made up of HGP. And as a matter of fact, Sweden is one of the 
only country which has had an improvement on CB, based on the comparison in the total 
number of different domestic champion, post Bosman ruling.  
Figure 21- Two decades comparison in the total of different domestic champions 
- Source55 
 
                                               
55 (Murray Dalziel, 2013), Study on the Assessment of UEFA’s "Home grown Players rule" 
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In an interview to the daily mail, the French coach of Arsenal, Arsène Wenger, gave his 
opinion about a possible increase in the minimum quota of HGP from 8 to 12 in the 
premier league: 56 
“That means as well that the rules of the game must be structured to favor the best. Or 
we are not in a competition anymore…So we can say one of two things - we protect the 
mediocre or we produce the best players.” 
He consequently gives this interesting example. 
“In Yugoslavia in the past they decided you had to play three players on the team sheet 
who were under 21. What happened? They became professional subs. It happened in 
France, too.”…”Then they decided you had to play three players (aged) under 21 from 
the start. You know what happened? They subbed all three after five minutes.” 
Wenger’s argument is coherent; he is not willing as a coach to leave the best players on 
the bench. And the best players of the Premier League should be playing.  
But the sad reality is that today, only 35% of Premier leagues players are English, 
compared to 60% of Spanish players in Spain or 59% in Germany. Half of the 30 richest 
European teams are English, and thanks to this financial power, they can attract the best 
talents, contributing to competitive imbalance. 
The introduction of stricter regulations for home-grown players involves some risks. 
Indeed, young players would have a more important role. So it is likely that teams will 
enter in a transfer war, to sign the best young players and integrate them in their 
academy. Even though, the FIFA has strict regulations concerning the transfer of young 
players, these are still possible. The latest example is the highly mediatized transfer of 
the 16 year old Norwegian talent, Odegaard to Real Madrid, for a fee of some 3M Euro.57 
There seems to be pros and cons to the introduction of HGP minimum quota. It works in 
certain small markets such as Belgium, Sweden and Finland. But concerning major 
leagues, the introduction of HGP quota provides mixed results. 
 
                                               
56 (Dailymail, Arsene-Wenger-warns-home-grown-quota-damage-Premier-League., 2015) 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-3015480/Arsene-Wenger-warns-home-
grown-quota-damage-Premier-League.html#ixzz3a0M851Ns  
57 (Dailymail, /Martin-Odegaard-signs-Real-Madrid, 2015) 
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6.6 Changing European leagues competition format 
There are 2 main competitions formats in sports, competitions where everyone play 
against everyone and the one that have the most points at the end of the season is the 
champion. Or the knock out competition system where teams are drawn to play other 
teams, either randomly or in function of their performances. In a knock out competition, 
the team who loses the direct confrontation is eliminated.  
In football, some of the competitions are based on the knock out format and some others 
on the classic championships points system. All domestic leagues are using the classic 
championship point system, but for international competitions, the knock out competition 
format is preferred. For example the wold cup or the Champion’s League are knock out 
tournaments. And domestic leagues such as the English Premier League or the Italian 
Serie A have classics championships points system. 
However, many other sports use another competition format for domestic leagues, the 
so-called playoffs. Where almost every teams still stand a chance of winning the league 
even until the very end of the season. Something which cannot happen in football, where 
it is often easy to guess between which teams the title is going to be played. 
In North America, the playoff system is prevalent. But it is not only an American system, 
almost all European hockey leagues, including Switzerland have playoffs. There are pros 
and cons to the implementation of a playoff system. But in 2009, the Belgium Jupiler 
league “made the leap” and introduced a playoff system. What can we learn from the 
introduction of playoffs in the Belgian Jupiler league? Does playoffs increase competitive 
balance? 
6.7 Jupiler league case study 
Named after a famous multinational beer company, the Belgium league opted for a 
system of playoffs in 2009. The goal is to foster competitiveness amongst Belgian teams, 
and add more uncertainty to the championship. However, the system introduced is quite 
complex, and did not go without critics. It works as follow. The season is divided in 2 
parts, a first part where the 16 teams play 2 times against each other. A second part, 
where 3 groups are created, according to the ranking of the first part of the season. 
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1st group 
 Half the points from the championship 
 10 games in total 
2nd group A 
 Teams ranking 7,9,11,13 
 Points starts from 0 again 
 6 games 
 The winner play against the winner of group 2 B for a place in Europa league 
2nd group B 
 Teams ranking 8,10,12,14  
 Points starts from 0 again 
 6 games 
 The winner play against the winner of group 2 A for a place in Europa league 
3rd group 
 Teams ranking 15th and 16th play each other 5 times 
 The loser of the confrontation is relegated 
 
The system resulted in actually some good outcomes for the league : 
 TV revenues have increased by 60%58 
 Belgium went from the 15th place in 2010 to the 10th place in 2015 in the UEFA 
leagues coefficient ranking 
 Multiplication of games between top teams 
 Revitalization of the middle table 
The main critics were the following 
 Too many games (40 instead of 32 before), thus difficult for the players who 
also play in national team. As it is difficult for teams who play European cups, 
they can play as much as 3 times a week. 
 Only 1 team from the 2nd division can be promoted 
 Too hard to understand 
 Fans were reluctant to change. “It can make for an exciting end to the season 
but it’s not really football as it was meant to be.”59 A Belgian fan 
 Anderlecht won the last 3 championships 
In regard to CB, playoffs provides mixed-results because even though there was more 
uncertainty of outcomes until the end of the season, the same team, Anderlecht, won 3 
times in a row the championship. A Scottish research compared long term CB in the 
                                               
58 (Hypercube, 2009), http://www.hypercube.nl/en/cases/reforming-belgian-
competition-2009/  
59 (belgofoot.be, 2012), http://www.belgofoot.be/the-jupiler-league-playoffs-all-you-ever-wanted-
to-know/  
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Scottish league and the Belgian league, using the standard deviation of points.60 The 
result shows almost no change in the standard deviation for Belgium from 2009 to 
2012.61 However, the research only analysed data for the first 30 games, without 
including the playoff period which has a unique form of uncertainty of outcomes. Indeed, 
in the last 2 seasons, the title race was still open until the last game.62 
Concerning games attendance averages, it seems there are no major improvements if 
we compare the average attendance of 2008 and 2011.63 
As a conclusion, we can see that changing of competition format in an environment 
where fans are very conservative and reluctant to change is difficult. In order to attract 
the public interest, a new model has to be simple and easy to understand by diehard 
fans as well as by people who watch a game once in while on TV. 
Also a change in competition format can have several positive consequences. As the 
best teams play each other more often, there is more uncertainty of outcomes, which 
render the games more exciting. Every team, until the very end of the season, plays for 
something. In a 20 teams classical competition format, teams between the 14th rank and 
the 8th rank usually have nothing to win or to lose in the last quarter of the championships. 
This does not happen in competitions with playoffs. 
6.8 Observations 
Depending on one league uncertainty of outcomes, a playoff format might have different 
consequences. For example, in Spain, Italy or England where intra season CB is lower 
than in other leagues, a playoff format could increase the number of exciting games for 
fans. 22 
We have seen with the Belgium example, that playoff system means an adaption of the 
number of teams participating in the league. Except Germany, all big 5 leagues have 20 
teams, in this condition a playoff system would be difficult to implement. Thus, the playoff 
system question the size of a market, a debate that every league must have in order to 
develop an optimum level of competitiveness and CB balance. 
                                               
60 Standard deviation is a statistic tool which measure the variation around the average. Total 
number of point minus average -> squared (to have only positive results- >average of the 
square results 
61 (squareeye, 2011), http://clients.squareeye.net/uploads/sd/The_Fans_Plan_The_Problem.pdf  
62 (sport.be, s.d.)http://www.sport.be/fr/jupilerproleague/archief/fixture.html?comp=2728  
63 (billsportsmaps, 2013), http://billsportsmaps.com/?category_name=belgium  
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7. Breakaway leagues; is it a threat or opportunity for 
European football? 
In Europe, there is a widespread idea that some teams have become too good and too 
strong for their domestic leagues. After having won 4 national titles in a row and being 
so dominant in Series A this year, Juventus barely celebrated winning the title, which 
fans now take almost for granted. However, whether it is in Italy with Juventus, Bayern 
München in Germany or the duopoly between Real Madrid and Barcelona in Spain, 
similar cases in point can be found across all European domestic leagues.  
In this context, the idea of breakaway leagues is not only a fan’s fantasy but is the result 
of several projects in the past. One of them is the Altantic league, a proposition to reunite 
the best Portuguese, Dutch, Belgian, Scottish and Scandinavian teams. The creation of 
such a league would raise TV revenue and enable these teams to finally have the means 
to compete with the big 5 leagues. However, UEFA does not support this proposition as 
they see the Atlantic league as a competitor to their own European clubs’ competitions. 
In addition, the creation of the Atlantic league could pave the way to other reunified 
leagues, such as an Eastern Europe league, a Balkans league, a central Europe league 
or even a European Super League which could render UEFA competitions utterly 
obsolete. This is probably the main reason why UEFA is against the creation of the 
Atlantic league. 64 
7.1.1 European Super League 
The idea of a European Super League is not new. This concept began in 1991, when an 
informal group called “media partners” was formed by Silvio Berlusconi (the owner of AC 
Milan and several private television networks in Italy). The lobbying group achieved the 
creation of the Champions League, a group phase tournament replacing the previous 
knock-out version called “European Champions Club’s Cup”.65 The goal behind it was to 
enable the play of more European games in order to increase TV revenue. 
In 1998, the G-14 was established; a group uniting the 14 strongest teams in the history 
of European football, where new members could only join on invitation. The goal of this 
lobbying group was to safeguard their interest on an international basis. One of the 
achievements of the G-14 was to get a bigger share of the TV revenue from the 
Champions League, originating in the creation of the market pool system where countries 
                                               
64 (Guardian, 2015), http://observer.theguardian.com/sport/story/0,6903,644267,00.html 
65 (Guardian, 2015), http://observer.theguardian.com/sport/story/0,6903,644267,00.html 
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from bigger TV markets get more money than others. In 2008, they achieved to get 
compensation from UEFA and FIFA for the selection of club players for the national 
teams. After this compromise in 2008, the G-14 agreed to disband and was replaced by 
the European Club Association which has 100 club members from all 53 European 
national associations. The motto of the European Club Association is “"LEADING THE 
WAY FOR FOOTBALL CLUBS IN EUROPE".66 Their goal is, basically, to safeguard the 
interests of the clubs in European football matters.  
For many football experts, the European Super League looks like the next inevitable step 
to what has become a global market.67 But is horizontal integration a threat or an 
opportunity for European football?  
On the paper, a European Super League seems like the perfect solution for everyone. 
Teams which now play a secondary role in their leagues might be able to take part in the 
title race. And, the best teams of the continent would play each other every week. We 
could imagine that the uncertainty of outcomes would increase and that fans would be 
content. 68 
However, the response of key stakeholders such as national leagues, UEFA, the clubs 
themselves, the media and more importantly the fans would be the key success factors 
to the creation of this league. The criteria would be as follows: 
 Competition format 
 Open or closed league? 
 Governance? 
 What regulatory instruments? (salary cap, revenue sharing) 
 TV revenue sharing? 
UEFA and the national leagues would be the main losers of the creation of a European 
Super League. Since the latter would directly replace UEFA competitions, it would be a 
big revenue shortfall for UEFA as well as for the domestic leagues which would generate 
less TV revenue.  
                                               
66 (ECA, about-eca, 2015), http://www.ecaeurope.com/about-eca/ 
67 (is-a-european-super-league-an-inevitable-next-step-in-world-football, s.d.) 
68 (Pijetlovic, 2015), EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football  
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In addition, most teams in Europe are century-old organizations; their history has been 
built around local rivalries which is part of Europe football culture. For local fans, it would 
definitely be a pity not to see these traditional local derbies (rivalries).  
Also, some teams participating in the European Super League might not be as 
competitive as they used to be. Is it better to play for first place in your league or battle 
for the relegation competition in a European Super League?  
In recent years, there were rumors about the creation of a European Super League to 
begin play in 2018. However, the president of the European Club Association, Karl-Heinz 
Rummenigge, addressed this question “"Our European Super League is the UEFA 
Champions League! We are very happy with the current competitions and our extremely 
fruitful collaboration with UEFA. We will continue to work together with UEFA for this year 
and beyond 2018." 69 
Whether this was diplomatic communication or real intentions, no one really knows. The 
exponential increase in TV revenues from both domestic leagues and the Champions 
League seems to have satisfied Europe’s biggest clubs for now. However, what will 
happen when this revenue growth begins to diminish? The European Super League 
might have been put aside for the next few years, but, for sure, this proposition will be 
on the table again at some point. 
  
                                               
69 (ECA, 2013), http://www.ecaeurope.com/news/eca-dismisses-idea-to-create-european-super-
league/ 
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8. Recommandations 
Several proposals to produce better CB were explored in the analysis. We will now 
review and compare them in respect to their implementation barriers and effect on CB. 
Last but not least, we will address further research suggestions in the field of CB in 
European football. 
The following figure points out the Impact on CB of each recommendation, and the 
implementations barriers. We can see the big gap on the bottom right of the matrix, 
meaning that there is unfortunately not an easy measure to implement that would greatly 
improve CB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increase competitive balance in European football, a strategic approach 
Emilien CRETTON 56 
 
8.1 Suspend the market pool system for the distribution of TV 
revenues for the CL 
 
 Effect on CB : Increase CB in European cups – could worsen CB in some 
domestic league 
 Implementation barriers : high 
 Recommended  
The actual distribution supports the big 5 teams dominance over European football. By 
dropping the market pool and redistribute the money equally between performance 
bonus and participation bonus, the distribution of revenues would be more even. The 
relationship between more financial strength and sporting results has been proven. Thus 
by introducing a financial tool able to reduce the disparities, the UEFA could foster CB 
in its competitions.   
Moreover, the distribution of TV revenues in all the biggest domestic leagues, mainly 
depends on one team television audience, participating to the financial polarization. By 
adopting a more equal system, the UEFA would show the example and develop a debate 
questioning the relevance of the actual system. 
Concerning the possible negative effects; by increasing the financial power of teams 
from smaller markets, the financial gap amongst smaller domestic markets could 
increase. So, by improving CB in its competition, UEFA could worsen CB in national 
leagues, therefore the implementation has to be well thought in order to have a positive 
effect on the general CB in European football. In order to safeguard domestic competitive 
balance, another financial constraint, such as the luxury tax, would be optimum. This is 
because it would redistribute monies from the Champions League amongst all the teams 
in the national leagues. 
The implementation could create a lot of stir inside the industry. Indeed, this measure, 
would mean more financial risk for teams from the big 5, as their revenue would depend 
more on performance results. Discontent from big 5 teams could lead to the creation of 
a closed league between top teams, the so called European Super League. The UEFA 
also have to deal with the European anti-trust laws. Accordingly, the implementation 
barriers are considered as quite high. 
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8.2 Soft Salary cap in national league 
 
 Effect on CB : very high 
 Implementation barriers: very high 
 Recommended  
Based on the soft salary cap with a luxury tax system model tested for the 2013/14 
season of the Premier league, the ratio between the team which spend the most on 
wages and the one which spend the less would go from 5:1 to 3:1.  
There is a positive correlation between total wages for a team and the total points 
accumulated in a season, so it is believed that this measure would highly improve CB.  
The main losers would be the 5 teams with the highest payroll. On the contrary all teams 
which respect the cap would be the winners. 
The implementation barriers are very high, we can expect the top teams to strongly lobby 
against a measure that would target them. A negative reaction from foreign media who 
have bought Premier League TV rights is also expected. Foreign media are more 
interested in clashes between the top teams. If these top teams would have less “top 
class players”, the Premier League product is likely to become less attractive. And, if 
other European leagues do not apply a SC, the English Premier League would be at 
disadvantage. Also the league has an incentive to see the best teams of the league 
perform well on a European basis. For local fans, who go to the game, those who do not 
support a team because it wins every week, the introduction of a SC would be a positive 
measure. But as we can see the interest of the strongest stakeholders would go against 
this proposal. Accordingly, the implementations barriers would be very high. This is 
probably why so far no football national association have introduced a fixed SC in their 
leagues. 
Even though the implementation barriers are very high, this proposal is recommended if 
it is applied in all domestic league, in order not to create inequalities on an international 
scale. 
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8.3 Obligation to field at least 3 home grown players (HGP) in 
the UEFA competitions 
 
 Effect on CB : low 
 Implementation barriers: moderate 
 Not recommended 
When it comes to youth development, the UEFA must show the example. The first 
measure introduced in 2008 which obliges teams participating to an UEFA competition 
to include 8 HGP on the score sheet, paved the way for a football with more space for 
young players. All teams complied with the regulation, however, the average minutes 
played by HGP unfortunately remained the same as before. 
A minimum quota of HGP players to be field would oblige teams to rely more on home 
talents and develop their academy. But the rule could be bypassed, by substituting 
directly players at the beginning of the game. Even though, of course, it would give an 
atrocious image for teams doing this.  
In addition, the financial domination of a handful of teams in their league, would bring a 
fierce competition in trying to sign the best talents. Teams from smaller market would 
sell their best young player, and the effect on CB would remain low. In consequence, the 
measure is not recommended for all markets, it must be assessed based on one league 
environment whether or not the measure would be effective. But in the frame of the UEFA 
Champions League, it is not a recommended solution. 
8.4 Gate revenue sharing 
 Effect on CB : high 
 Implementation barriers : too high 
 Not recommended  
Any revenue sharing system amongst team from a league would promote CB. 
Nonetheless, the measure would be impossible to apply in an industry where sharing 
equally the TV revenues is already subject to much debate. 
In addition, teams which invest in new facilities have more gate revenues, as well as 
more debt resulting from these investments. On the other hand, teams with old stadiums 
do not have any amortization expenses and would benefit from this regulation. Thus, the 
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measure could dissuade club owners to invest in their facilities and promote short term 
vision. For these reasons, gate revenue sharing is not recommended. 
8.5 Playoff system for the European leagues 
 
 Effect on CB : low 
 Implementation barriers : low to moderate 
 Recommended  
The main advantage of the playoff system is the multiplication of games between top 
teams. When 2 teams of the same level play against each other, the uncertainty of 
outcomes is greater and draws more interest from fans. The effect on game and 
seasonal uncertainty would be positive. Concerning long term uncertainty, we did not 
see any changes in the Belgian league. 
A playoff system would increase the number of fixtures between top teams, which render 
the league more attractive as a TV product. The TV revenues in Belgium have increases 
by 60% and Belgian teams improved their results in Europe. We can therefore conclude 
that the league has become more competitive in European cups. 
Conversely, implementing a system of playoffs implies some constraints. The number of 
teams in the first division would have to be reduced, to no to more than 16 teams. The 
smaller teams would strongly lobby against this competition format. On the other hand, 
as the number of teams plummets, the TV revenue share for the remaining teams would 
be higher.  
Also the number of games is greater than in the actual system. Associations of players 
might therefore be against such a regulation. Indeed, today, the calendar is already 
hectic. Some teams play almost 60 games per year including European competition, 
domestic league and league cup. 
The playoff competition format is recommended for any league which can afford to have 
a maximum of 16 teams in its league. 
8.6 Further research suggestion 
The impact of an equal distribution of TV revenues in the Champion’s League has been 
found to be positive on international CB. However, further research on the effect on the 
domestic league would be necessary. 
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In all the measures put forward, the main barrier to the implementation is the actual 
structure of football in Europe. Some teams have become too strong for their leagues, 
and some leagues have become too weak to compete on an international level. 
In this context, the consolidation of European football could be one of the key to 
rebalance the football industry. The creation of a European Super League is not only a 
fan’s fantasy, but could really bring a solution to the existing problem. As well as the 
fusion of several football associations in order to create regional leagues. Evaluate 
implementation barriers and competitive balance effect of consolidation in European 
football would the necessary to go one step further. 
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9. Conclusion 
Thanks to new and secondary data, the decrease in competitive balance has been 
proved. Competitive balance is key in order for football to appeal to more fans. This is 
why, actions that could increase competitive balance and go beyond the FFP have been 
sought. 
A more equal distribution of TV revenue and limitation in wages (salary cap) were found 
to be the two most efficient recommendations in respect to their effects on competitive 
balance. Among all the new models of distribution of revenue for the Champions League 
proposed, the option 1, where most of the money is shared equally, is the option that 
would promote the most competitive balance. Concerning the salary cap, the results are 
better when applied with a very strict policy of financial penalties. Because when there 
are more limitations on the spending of top teams, financial gap reduces and the 
competitive balance increases. However, even though ideal in respect to competitive 
balance, these measures have been found difficult to apply, as it would go against the 
interest of too many powerful stakeholders. Indeed, if too much money was taken away 
from the top teams, they could break-away and create their own league. As a result, 
unfortunately for the fans interest, compromises will be necessary in terms of the 
strictness of measures that will be adopted and applied. 
The distribution of revenues from TV broadcasting rights has been found to be one of 
the main cause of the financial polarization. A model of distribution without taking into 
account the market pool for the Champions League has been tested. The results are 
conclusive and would foster more competitive balance on an international scale. The 
ideal revenue model would distribute the same amount of money to every team. 
However, a system where 57,5% of revenue is shared equally and 42,5% according to 
performances is recommended. It would be an applicable solution and efficient in respect 
to competitive balance. 
Concerning the payroll regulations. A soft salary cap with a luxury tax based on the NBA 
system was found very efficient for restoring competitive balance. Indeed, as in Europe 
the financial gap between big and small teams is colossal, teams would not be able to 
respect a hard salary cap. This is why, a luxury tax would make more sense in European 
football, and it would allow teams to go over the salary cap by paying a tax which would 
then be redistributed equally amongst all teams. In the model tested in the English 
Premier League, a tax rate of 40% was applied, resulting in a decrease by 30% of the 
financial gap between the richest and poorest teams. The tax rate is of course a very 
sensitive factor, the higher it is the more balanced the league is. But once again, a 
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compromise has to be made between all the stakeholders, so that the measure could 
realistically be applied.  
The possible implementation of a playoff system is another option addressed. The playoff 
system is widely used in others sports and adds more uncertainty to the end of a season. 
Since 2009, Belgium has become the first European domestic league to have playoffs. 
Although not popular amongst fans because too complicated, playoffs had a positive 
effect on Belgian’s team’s competitiveness in the UEFA cups. And TV revenues rose by 
60%. However, in a playoff system, the number of teams in the league has either to be 
increased or decreased. It must therefore be assessed based on a league environment, 
whether or not the measure is applicable.  
Concerning the share of gate revenues, it is not a recommended option. Because it 
would prevent teams’ owners from investing in stadium facilities and adopting long term 
vision. 
Oblige teams to field homegrown players was not found conclusive. As it could result in 
a transfer war on young talents, which would not serve the interest of the small teams 
and thus not foster competitive balance. 
For all the measures, the implementation barriers were found to be particularly high, due 
to the environment of European football. But competitive balance is key and must be 
subject to discussion by the UEFA and the domestic football associations. What vision 
for the football of tomorrow? Do we want a sport where all the games can become more 
exciting? Or favor top teams in order to assist to a couple of clashes per year involving 
the best players of the planet on the same pitch?  
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